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The U.S. ballistic missile defense system planned for Europe continues to be the subject of 
harsh criticism by Moscow, even after President Barack Obama’s adopted in September 
2009 the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). In January 2012 Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev warned Washington that, if the US attempted to deploy any 
ballistic missile defense systems in Europe, Moscow could withdraw from the New START 
Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), which entered into force on February 5, 2011 
and is expected to last until 2021, and deploy Iskander missiles, capable of carrying 
nuclear weapons, in Luga, a small city in the outside St. Petersburg in the Leningrad 
Region. 
Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s Ambassador to NATO and Medvedev’s Special Envoy for Missile 
Defense until December 23, 2011, did not refrain from criticizing Washington’s plans. The 
basing of separate parts of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system in the “New Europe,” he 
said in October 2011, is a “reckless and dangerous move,” and is inconsistent with the 
installation of a broader joint Russia-U.S. missile defense system, a project advocated by 
the Medvedev administration. The position of the Russian ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
clear on the EPAA: the U.S. plans to deploy an ABM shield in Europe continue to be 
implemented against the backdrop of inconclusive bilateral negotiations on the issue.  
Furthermore, Moscow claims that the U.S. missile defense system in Eastern Europe 
represents a threat to its own national security. The Kremlin is particularly critical of plans 
to install various components of the system at the Romanian Air Base at Deveselu as part 
of the second phase of the EPAA. That section of the overall project is an air defense 
system engaged in the detection, tracking, interception and destruction of attacking short-
range and nuclear-armed Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The plan consists of 
the gradual fielding between now and 2020 of increasingly advanced missile interceptors at 
land bases in Poland and Romania and on U.S. battleships home ported in Spain. A radar 
system, located in Turkey and collecting data on potential high-altitude missile threats, 
would support the interceptors based in Eastern Europe. 
One of Russia’s key arguments is that the Romanian facility is located only 500 kilometers 
from the Russian Sevastopol naval base in Crimea, home to Russia’s Black Sea fleet. 
Russia is also concerned with the Obama administration’s decision to deploy 24 American 
interceptor missiles, which form an integral part of a NATO missile shield, on Polish bases 
by 2018. At the end of February 2012 the Commanding General of US Army forces in 
Europe, Mark P. Hertling, confirmed for the first time that a long-range radar system is now 
established in Turkey and fully operational. Rogozin reacted and told that this move would 
allow the U.S. missile defense system to target sites as far as Russia’s Ural Mountains, 
and thus would partially override the Western defense zone of Russia’s own 
intercontinental ballistic missile system.  
Yet, Russia’s claims are difficult to substantiate. For example, the Sevastopol base is in 
Ukraine, not Russia, and both Russian and Ukrainian warships, which may at some point 
be used as part of Russia-Ukraine defensive alliance, are harbored there. In addition, 
Russia has military bases in Kaliningrad, the Southern Caucasus, Central Asia and the 
Middle East.  
It is obvious that finding a site in Europe for the deployment of a U.S. ballistic missile 
defense system that can keep track of incoming missiles from Middle East states, all the 
while avoiding encroaching on Russian military facilities and space, is almost impossible. 
Russia is somewhat overstating the actual threat that a U.S. ABM system would pose to its 
territory, all the more so since placing any defensive systems in Poland, Romania and 
other European countries is not likely to neutralize, as American officials keep repeating, 
Russia’s own long-range nuclear arsenal. 
Russia’s actual motives in objecting to the U.S. plans are based on pragmatic 
considerations above all. A missile defense shield built in Eastern European countries 
would further integrate the region into the Western security structure under the aegis of the 
United States. This in turn would add to Eastern Europe’s already close relationship with 
the United States. The end result would be to significantly boost the status of Eastern 
European countries in the international arena. Such a situation is unacceptable for Russia, 
which seeks to remain a major international player in its own right. Russia is also afraid to 
be militarily outpaced by other nations. The U.S. presence in Eastern Europe is worrisome 
to Moscow and is perceived at home as a destabilizing force that can potentially 
marginalize Russia in Eurasia.   
Other factors explain Moscow’s reaction. After being moved into Romania and Poland, 
U.S. components and technology could soon spillover into the former Soviet space, and 
this is a challenge to the neo-imperial ambitions of Russia. The Kremlin considers 
American incursion into Eastern Europe as an “insult.” On the other hand, remaining silent 
about U.S. missile defense plans could be interpreted in Washington as a tacit admission 
by the Russians of the superiority of the American system over the Russian one. According 
to most military experts, Russia’s A-35, A-135 and S-300 systems are obsolete and should 
be soon mothballed. The manufacturers of the new S-400 have not yet received a new 
order from the Ministry of Defense to start production of the latest defense system 
generation. In addition, the complex S-500 missile defense system has run into major 
difficulties. Therefore, Moscow has virtually no effective means of countering certain 
components of the EPAA.  
 
Conversely, the Kremlin understands that if it continues to actively oppose U.S. plans, this 
may pose problems for the U.S. and NATO, the Western military alliance. If Washington 
cannot agree with Moscow on the European ABM system issue before the upcoming 
NATO summit on May 20-21 in Chicago, this and other important decisions may be 
delayed or the prospect of stopping U.S. plans may disappear altogether.  
Russia has consistently emphasized that having elements of a U.S. missile defense in 
Europe threatens its national security. Therefore, before making concessions to the West 
over this issue Moscow may require a payoff in other areas of international politics. It is 
then possible to view the “aggressive” Russian rhetoric as a last ditch attempt to gain 
present and future negotiating chips. 
Finally, if a political agreement on missile defense cooperation is reached with the United 
States in the coming months, Russia is expected to attempt to influence U.S plans by 
insisting for a joint verification system. It is also expected that in order to increase the level 
of “mutual trust” Russia will seek a legally binding agreement that provides for the 
inspection of missile defense facilities in Europe, a limit on the quantity of missile 
interceptors to be deployed and a map of their locations.  
The Obama administration has recently floated alternative ideas to assuage Russian 
concerns, real or otherwise. For instance, it has invited Russian observation missions to 
observe the future Aegis SM-3 missile defense flight tests scheduled to take place in 
Hawaii. The Americans seek to convince the Russians that interceptors to be deployed in 
Eastern Europe are technically incapable of shooting down Russian strategic missiles. 
Moscow, however, has generally not been forthcoming to these American proposals. One 
can expect that talks between Russia and the United States on building a cooperative 
missile defense system in Europe are to go nowhere until after the U.S. Presidential 
Elections in November 2012. 
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